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PERSPECTIVE
THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
OWEN M. FIss*
Two assumptions frequently underlie discussions concerning
the transitions from dictatorship to democracy that occurred in
Latin America in the 1980s. The first is that the judiciary will have
an important role to play in the new democratic regimes, and the
second is that every effort must be made to assure the judiciary's
independence. I can readily embrace both assumptions, but hesi-
tate because I believe that the concept of judicial independence is
far more complex than first appears.
The term "independence" is generally used to characterize the
relationship of the judiciary to other institutions or agencies.1 An
independent judge is one who is not under the influence or control
of someone else. An element of ambiguity arises, however, because
* Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University. I wish to thank Terence Anderson, Eric
Beckman, Eric Bentley, Jr., Marcel Bryar, Rodrigo P. Correa, Steve Diamond, Kenneth
Held, Elizabeth Iglesias, Stanley Katz, Jonathan Miller, Maxwell Peltz, Keith Rosenn,
Pablo Ruiz-Tagle, Kevin Russell, Irwin Stotzky, and Olivier Sultan for commenting on this
paper and giving me the benefit of their thoughts. An earlier version of this paper was
presented at a conference held at the University of Miami in March 1992, and later
published in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY
(Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
1. Independence is an essential attribute of good judging, but it is not the only one, and
nothing is gained by letting it stand for all the judicial virtues. I therefore take exception to
Professor Kahn's broadening of the notion of judicial independence to include "indepen-
dence from ideology." Paul W. Kahn, Independence and Responsibility in the Judicial
Role, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 73 (Irwin
P. Stotzky ed., 1993); see also Jorge Correa Sutil, The Judiciary and Political System in
Chile: The Dilemmas of Judicial Independence During the Transition, in TRANSITION TO
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY, supra, at 89. Judges can be
independent, yet fail in discharging their most elemental duties because they do not under-
stand the issues before them, lack courage, or are captured by an outworn and antiquated
philosophy.
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there are several different kinds of institutions or agencies from
which the judge is to be independent. Judges are supposed to be
independent, but from whom?
One notion of independence-I will call it "party detach-
ment"-requires the judge to be independent from the parties in
the litigation, not to be related to them or in any way under their
control or influence. This aspect of independence is rooted in the
idea of impartiality and is uncompromising in its demands-the
more detachment from the parties the better. The bribe is, of
course, the extreme example of a violation of this demand. But a
less blatant link to one of the parties, such as a cultural tie that
could cause the judge to identify with one party more than the
other, may also count as a transgression.
Another form of independence-"individual autonomy"-con-
cerns collegial relationships or the power of one judge over an-
other. In common law systems, judges feel the pressure of other
judges through the doctrine of stare decisis. Also, in both common
and civil law countries, higher court judges exercise control over
their lower court colleagues through regular appellate procedures.
These traditional forms of collegial control do not threaten the in-
dependence that rightly belongs to a judge. But more bureaucratic
forms of control, such as those recently instituted in the United
States through the Judicial Councils Reform Act of 1980,2 may
threaten a judge's independence, or more specifically the judge's
claim for individual autonomy. That Act gives the judicial councils
of the circuit courts power to investigate complaints against trial
judges and to take disciplinary action that the judicial council
deems appropriate.3 It thereby allows one group of judges, acting
through an organization rather than the traditional appellate pro-
cedures, to review the work of an individual judge and discipline
him or her.
Such bureaucratic controls may be commonplace in civil law
2. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 § 3,
28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B) (1989).
3. Section 3 of the Act provides a partial catalogue of "appropriate" sanctions: (1) certi-
fying the disability of a judge; (2) requesting that a judge voluntarily retire; (3) ordering
temporarily that new cases be assigned to a judge; and (4) reprimanding a judge, either
publicly or privately. Id. § 372(c)(6)(B). In addition, the judicial council may refer any com-
plaint to the Judicial Conference of the United States, which may, if it determines that
impeachment may be warranted, refer the matter to the House of Representatives. Id.
§ 372(c)(7). See generally Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE
L.J. 1442, 1445 (1983).
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countries, where the judiciary is treated as a branch of the civil
service and lawyers enter the service at an early point of their ca-
reers, but the introduction of these controls into United States
practice has alarmed some." In part, this concern is based on spe-
cific cultural norms of the United States (its rampant individual-
ism) and stems from the tradition, most prevalent in the federal
courts, of recruiting judges laterally. Someone who becomes a
judge after a long and successful career in a profession or politics is
likely to expect a greater measure of individual autonomy than the
person who moves through the ranks of a professional corps. The
distrust of such bureaucratic forms of control in the United States
is not, however, entirely cultural specific, and may well have a
more theoretical basis.
The power of judges is both limited and legitimated by the
processes by which they exercise power-the need to listen to all
the relevant parties and to justify their decisions in terms of pub-
licly acceptable reasons.' These limits are fully respected when
higher court judges supervise other judges through the ordinary
appellate procedures, but not when they act bureaucratically, for
example, through judicial councils. Then the higher court judges
act as managers, not judges. Of course, some forms of miscon-
duct-bribery, for instance-may not be controllable through the
ordinary appellate procedures, but in that case recourse should be
had to impeachment and removal procedures. The impeachment
and removal procedures are in the control of legislators rather than
judges, and thus do not call upon judges to act in ways that are
inconsistent with the limits on their power.
A third form of independence-the most difficult to under-
stand and the focus of this essay-concerns what I will call "politi-
cal insularity." It requires that the judiciary be independent of po-
litical institutions and the public in general. This form of
independence overlaps with party detachment whenever one of the
litigants before the court happens to be another branch of the
state (say the executive), but it is required even when a case is
wholly between private parties and thus should be seen as a sepa-
rate requirement. It stems from the very nature of the judicial
function and the obligation of the judges to decide what is just, not
4. See generally Lynn A. Baker, Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Coun-
cil Reforms and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117 (1985).
5. See Fiss, supra note 3, at 1443; Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978
Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979).
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to choose the best public policy nor the course of action most de-
sired by the public. The moral authority of the judiciary depends
not solely on the dialogic processes through which judges exercise
power, that is, listening to arguments and giving justification, but
also on whether they are free from any political influence. The
greater the insularity from political control, the more likely judges
are to do what is just rather than what is politic.
While political insularity can thus be seen as one of the foun-
dations of judicial authority, it is also true that this dimension of
independence, in contrast to party detachment, is not unrelenting
in its demands. We aspire only for a limited measure of insularity.
In fact, our quest to insulate the judiciary from political control is
qualified by two distinct kinds of limits, and my principal purpose
here is to identify those limits. One arises from our democratic
commitments to majority rule. Political insularity may be neces-
sary to do justice, but removing the judiciary from popular control
might well interfere with democratic values. For that very reason,
the political insularity of judges within a democratic order is not
and should not be complete.
A second limit derives from the fact that independence is re-
gime relative. One regime need not respect the independence of
the judiciary established by a previous regime, anymore than one
nation is obliged to respect the independence of the judiciary of
another. While the first kind of limit on the demand for insularity
will be illustrated by reference to the experience in the United
States, often thought to possess the most independent judiciary,
the second is revealed by reference to the transition to democracy
that occurred in Argentina and Chile in the 1980s.
I.
While state and local courts are essential elements of the
United States judicial system, the federal courts are the more cele-
brated division of that system. They are treated as the fullest em-
bodiment of the ideal of judicial independence. We boast of the
political insularity of the federal courts and point to Article III of
the Constitution, providing life tenure and protection against dimi-
nution of pay, as the essential guarantor of independence.' In the
6. Article III provides in pertinent part: "The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance
[Vol. 25:1
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same spirit, we explain how the work of the federal judiciary is
protected against easy revision by the political branches. The Su-
preme Court's interpretations of the Constitution can be revised
only by the cumbersome amendment process, which requires spe-
cial majorities in each house of Congress, and approval by three-
fourths of the states.'
Some of the constitutional protections of independence have
been reinforced by the evolution of broad cultural understandings
that further insulate the judiciary from political control. A case in
point concerns the impeachment power. The Constitution vests
this power in Congress but does not specify the permissible
grounds of impeachment. Article III speaks only in the most gen-
eral terms, providing that judges "shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour." Another provision provides for impeachment of
all civil officers of the United States for "high Crimes and Misde-
meanors." 8 In the early history of the nation, the power of im-
peachment was in fact used to express strong disagreement with
judicial decisions.9 However, no judge has ever been removed for
that reason, and with the exception of an attack on Justice Doug-
las in the late 1960s by then Representative Gerald Ford,1" an un-
derstanding has evolved under which a judge can be impeached
and removed only for violation of the most elemental duties of of-
fice, such as corruption or conviction of a crime-not because the
legislature disagrees with the judge on the merits of some
decision."
in Office." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
7. Article V provides in pertinent part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legisla-
tures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as
part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V.
8. Article II, section 4 provides: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
9. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 52-53, 58-60, 74-77, 90-93, 103-05 (1992);
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 224-51 (Stanley N. Katz ed.,
1973).
10. EDWIN P. HOYT, WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 149-51 (1979).
11. In recent years, federal judges have been impeached for tax fraud, bribery, and per-
jury. Mark A. Hutchison, Maintaining Public Confidence in the Integrity of the Judiciary:
1993]
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This mythic picture of the political independence of the fed-
eral judiciary is often buttressed with references to some of the
more dramatic instances in which the Supreme Court defied the
executive or legislature. Celebrated examples include the decision
of the Court requiring President Nixon to surrender secret tapes of
his conversations; 2 the one declaring illegal. President Truman's
seizure of the nation's steel mills during the Korean War; 3 and the
order of the Court requiring Congress to seat a newly-reelected
Adam Clayton Powell. 14 The truth, however, is more complex than
this one-sided telling of victorious moments may convey. While the
Constitution creates a measure of political insularity for the fed-
eral judiciary, a number of other factors-some also rooted in the
Constitution-bring the judiciary to some extent under the sway of
one or the other of the political branches.
The first and most obvious concerns the method of selection.
In the United States, a large number of state court judges are
elected, making them directly accountable to a majority of their
constituents. Federal judges are appointed rather than elected, and
thus we tend to think of them as more independent of politics than
state court judges, but the fact of the matter is that they are ap-
pointed by a political officer, the President. Presumably, the Presi-
dent will not choose someone to do his bidding, and recognizes
that the judge's job is law, not politics. This limit on the discretion
of the President is reinforced by the expectations of the public and
the bar. Nonetheless, the President is likely to appoint someone
whose concept of justice approximates his own and who is likely to
further rather than impede the policies of his administration. The
Senate must confirm the appointment, but it too is a political
body-sometimes driven by a different agenda and responsive to a
different constituency than the President, but a political body
State Bar of Nevada v. Claiborne, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 283-84; see also IMPEACHMENT
TRIAL COMMITTEE ON THE ARTICLES AGAINST JUDGE ALCEE L. HASTINGS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
U.S. SENATE IN THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF ALCEE L. HASTINGS, A JUDGE OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, S. Doc. No. 18, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. REP. No. 164, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989) (concerning the im-
peachment of Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr., of Mississippi). The Supreme Court ultimately
rejected Judge Nixon's challenge to the procedures used in his impeachment. Nixon v.
United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993) (holding that the Senate has sole discretion to choose
impeachment procedures, and thus Judge Nixon's challenge of those procedures was nonjus-
ticiable). Following that decision, a similar challenge by Judge Hastings, another impeached
federal judge, was also rejected. Hastings v. United States, 837 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1993).
12. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
13. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).




Financial need may also increase the political vulnerability of
the judiciary. The protection against diminution of salary is an im-
portant bulwark against political control. It is qualified, however,
because it leaves judges subject to inflationary pressure: a decision
by Congress or the President to hold judicial salaries constant in
the face of spiraling inflation can act as a severe sanction. 15 Mind-
ful of congressional and executive control over their salaries, judges
trying to keep up with inflation may well tailor their actions in
such a way as to win the good will of these branches. The judici-
ary's attachment to the incidental emoluments of office, such as
secretaries, law clerks, and chauffeurs, can have a like effect, for
these too are within the control of Congress and the President.
In addition to their power over finances, Congress and the
President may also try to exercise power over the judiciary by spe-
cifically reversing judicial decisions. While it is true that a consti-
tutional ruling cannot be altered by simple legislative enactment,
Congress, with the concurrence of the President, can reverse a stat-
utory interpretation by a simple majority."6 Moreover, the political
branches wield significant power over the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, especially the lower ones. In the past, particularly contro-
versial decisions have led to proposals to deprive the federal courts
of jurisdiction over select subject matters as a way of curbing judi-
cial power.1 7 Few such measures have been enacted, but the threats
of such action and the formulation and announcement of concrete
15. See Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1009 (1978) (holding that Congress had not violated the Article III Compensation Clause by
failing to raise judicial salaries an amount equivalent to the rate of inflation). But see
United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (finding that Congress had violated Article III in
passing legislation which repealed a salary increase already in effect and thus "diminished"
the compensation of federal judges).
16. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation De-
cisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991).
17. For example, see the Norris-La Guardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1989), a federal
statute restricting the use of injunctions by federal courts in labor disputes. In the early
1980s, legislation was introduced to limit lower federal court jurisdiction over state anti-
abortion laws. See, e.g., S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3225, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981); H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Bills were also introduced to limit federal
court powers to order school busing. See, e.g., S. 1147, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1005,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 3332, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1180, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1981). For a general discussion of Congressional attempts to limit federal jurisdic-
tion, see Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARv. L. REV. 17, 17-20 (1981).
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plans to actualize those threats remind the judiciary of the limits
of its power.
Finally, some consideration must be given to the needs of en-
forcement. Judges speak the law and hope that there will be volun-
tary compliance with all that they command, but are always mind-
ful that resistance may well be encountered. They know that
requiring the release of a prisoner or the desegregation of the
schools may provoke sharp and passionate reactions.18 Judges may
be sovereign in articulating rights, but not in enforcing them. The
coercive machinery of the state-the sword-is in the immediate
control of the executive, and the purse strings are in the hands of
the legislature and executive.
For these reasons, the federal judiciary often finds itself de-
pendent on the other branches of government and thus less insu-
lated from politics than is ordinarily assumed. Of course, one must
be careful not to overstate the degree of dependence. For example,
while vesting the power of appointment in the President necessa-
rily introduces a political element, a difference in the terms of of-
fice-the President serves for four years, or possibly eight if re-
elected, while a federal judge has life tenure-tends to attenuate
the tie between the two. In the past, Supreme Court Justices often
served as informal advisers of the President, but this practice has
come under increasing attack and is now generally frowned upon.
In addition, an informal understanding-stemming largely
from President Roosevelt's fight over court-packing-limits the
process by which new judgeships are created and thus the Presi-
dent's influence on the composition of the judiciary. Frustrated by
a series of Supreme Court decisions invalidating various New Deal
measures, President Roosevelt sought to exploit a lacuna in the
Constitution, the failure to specify the number of justices, and pro-
posed creating new justiceships-one for each justice over sev-
enty.19 This proposal engendered great hostility in Congress and
18. See Fiss, supra note 5.
19. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 219-34
(1987); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing"
Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347. Executive interference with the judiciary had an early start in
United States history. Under President Thomas Jefferson, Republican frustration towards
the Federalist judiciary led to the initial refusal to issue commissions to certain judges Pres-
ident Adams had appointed, measures to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801 (thereby abolish-
ing the positions to which these new judges had been appointed), and legislation in 1802
which recessed the Supreme Court for fourteen months. In 1804, Jefferson engineered im-
peachment proceedings against one Supreme Court Justice, and by 1808 he had expanded
[Vol. 25:1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
the bar, forcing its withdrawal, and even more significantly, leaving
us with the understanding that the number of judges cannot be
increased solely to enhance the President's opportunity to make
appointments and shape the Court.
In light of all this, one cannot deny that federal judges enjoy a
hefty measure of political independence, but still it is important to
recognize that the mythic account of independence of the federal
judiciary in the United States is somewhat misleading. Political in-
sularity is an ideal of the federal judiciary, and its appeal seems to
be growing over time, but it does not entail or presuppose a com-
plete separation of the judiciary from the political branches of gov-
ernment. Even in the United States, we recognize that there must
be some limits to political insularity.
Initially, the qualified nature of our commitment to political
insularity might seem puzzling since, as I have acknowledged, it is
one of the foundations of the judiciary's authority. But it is less of
a puzzle when we place the judiciary within a democratic frame-
work and realize that an independent judiciary can interfere with
democratic processes. A judiciary that is insulated from the popu-
larly controlled institutions of government-the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches-has the power to curb the actions or decisions of
those institutions and thus to frustrate the will of the people.
Admittedly, an independent judiciary may sometimes use its
power to further the power of the electorate-for example, by pro-
tecting the integrity of the electoral process or political freedoms.
Even then, however, the tension between judicial independence
and democracy is not altogether absent, since undemocratic means
are being used to protect democratic ends. Granted, only an insti-
tution that is free of political control can serve as an effective
watchdog of the political process. Yet there is no guarantee that
the judicial power will be used to enhance rather than constrict the
power or political freedom of the electorate. In some instances, an
independent judiciary may be no more committed to the preserva-
tion of free and open debate than military officers who are simi-
larly insulated from politics.
An even more fundamental tension between democracy and
the Court from five members to seven, filling each new vacancy with a Republican. 2
GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED




judicial independence arises when, as is often the case, the judici-
ary goes beyond protecting the electoral process or political free-
doms and sets aside an executive or legislative act that could not
possibly be said to interfere with or undermine the representa-
tional process. Typically, those seeking to justify judicial indepen-
dence and to lessen this conflict expand upon the notion of democ-
racy and insist that it does not require a complete surrender to the
demands of the present electorate. 20 Democracy is presented as a
nuanced theory of governance that requires the state to be respon-
sive both to preferences and principles: the democratic state must
respond to both the occurrent demands of the electorate and to
certain transcendent values, such as the protection of human
rights, or to core principles embodied in a constitution. Within this
scheme, the judiciary appears as the privileged guardian of these
core principles or transcendent values, not least because it is insu-
lated from popular control and generally sequestered from politics.
Independence allows the judiciary to take the long view.
Such interpretations of democracy, distinguishing it from an
insistent populism and tying it to such notions as "constitutional-
ism" or the "rule of law," are commonplace today in both the
United States and elsewhere. They account for much of the appeal
of the ideal of political insularity, for insularity enhances an insti-
tution's capacity to make objective judgments. Yet the fact re-
mains that these more transcendent notions only justify a commit-
ment to a limited degree of independence. Democracy may be a
combination of principle and preference, but the proportion of
each is never specified. Moreover, while political insularity may
put the judiciary, as compared to the legislature or executive, in a
privileged position to speak authoritatively on questions of princi-
ple, there is no guarantee that what it says will be correct. A politi-
cally neutral interpretation is not necessarily a correct one. 21
Thus, although independence is assumed to be one of the car-
dinal virtues of the judiciary, it is also true that too much indepen-
dence may be a bad thing. We want to insulate the judiciary from
the more popularly controlled institutions, but at the same time
recognize that some elements of political control should remain.
We must accommodate two values-not just judicial legitimacy,
but popular sovereignty as well-and this requires us to optimize,
20. See e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991); Fiss, supra note 5.




rather than to maximize, this form of independence. In contrast to
party detachment, it is simply not true that in a democracy the
more political insularity the better. What we need is just the right
degree of insularity.
II.
The republics of Latin America subscribe to notions of judicial
independence that are not radically different from those which
govern the federal judiciary of the United States. In all these coun-
tries-including Chile and Argentina-political insularity is con-
sidered a virtue, although it is also understood that the separation
between political institutions and the judiciary is, and should al-
ways remain, less than absolute.
Sometimes the political insularity of the judiciary is greater in
the Latin American republics than in the United States. In Chile,
for example, where judging is a separate career line and a form of
civil service, Supreme Court Justices play an important role in se-
lecting lower court judges and choosing their own successors.22
There, the Justices create a short list of nominees for the Supreme
Court and court of appeals from which the President makes a se-
lection. In a similar vein, the provision in the Argentine Constitu-
tion protecting against the diminution of pay, though in words
identical to that found in Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion, has been interpreted more broadly to protect against diminu-
tion of pay through inflation, on the theory that it is concerned
with real, not just nominal, income.23
In other ways, of course, the tie between political institutions
and the judiciary has been considerably stronger in some Latin
American countries than in the United States. While consultation
between the President and the judiciary is exceptional in the
United States, and today is frowned upon, it is commonplace in
Argentina. President Alfonsin engaged in it, as does President
22. CONSTITUCI6N POLITICA DE LA REPOBLICA DE CHILE art. 75 (1980) [hereinafter CHILE
CONST.], translated in JAY A. SIGLER ET. AL., 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD: CHILE (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1991); Keith S. Rosenn, The
Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1,
19-21 (1987).
23. Bonorino Per6 v. Estado Nacional, Supreme Court of Argentina, November 15,
1985, 116 E.D. 321 (1985) and decisions of December 4, 1985 and April 4, 1986 [1986-I] J.A.
376, 377; Rosenn, supra note 22, at 29-30. But see id. at 17 n.48 (noting the decreasing
percentage of the Argentine national budget devoted to the federal judiciary).
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Menem. The norm against court-packing also seems distinctly less
robust. In 1990, for example, President Menem proposed legisla-
tion increasing the number of Justices from five to nine, and as
soon as that legislation was enacted, he proceeded to fill the newly
created vacancies with candidates of his own choosing.2" All this
was done in a context where Menem's party controlled the Senate
(which must confirm the appointments) and where party loyalty
was essentially taken for granted. To make matters worse, Presi-
dent Menem had allegedly earlier offered inducements in the form
of ambassadorships to encourage his predecessor's appointees to
resign.
In all these controversies, the background assumption is simi-
lar to that present in our analysis of judicial independence in the
United States. It is assumed that we are dealing with a continuous
democratic regime and that the need is to find the proper measure
of political insularity, one that accommodates both the needs of
judicial authority and popular sovereignty. But recent Latin Amer-
ican experience, in particular the transitions from authoritarianism
to democracy that Argentina and Chile underwent in the 1980s,
requires us to consider a different situation-that of a transitional,
as opposed to a continuous, democracy. In such situations, the
ideal of judicial independence is further limited: not only is inde-
pendence an ideal that must be optimized rather than maximized,
but it is also regime relative. We seem to agree that the judiciary
should be politically insulated from the regime of which it is a
part; but should the judiciary of one regime be insulated from the
successor regime?
The regime-relative nature of independence can be illustrated
by another reference to Argentina. In that country, a military dic-
tatorship seized power in 1976 and governed until 1983, at which
time the junta called for elections. Rafil Alfonsin was elected Presi-
dent and undertook to restore constitutional government, even to
the point of prosecuting the junta for human rights violations.2 5 In
the period from 1976 to 1983, the junta utilized pre-existing insti-
tutions, including the courts, to govern; but it did not use those
24. Argentina: Controversy Surrounding the Judiciary, 45 INT'L COMMISSION JURISTS
REV. 1, 4 (1990).
25. For a general discussion of Argentina's recent political history, see Irwin P. Stotzky,
The Fragile Bloom of Democracy, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 109-14 (1989); Carlos S. Nino,
The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put Into Context: The Case of Argen-
tina, 100 YALE L.J. 2619, 2622-23 (1991).
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institutions according to the norms established by the Constitu-
tion. For the most part, the junta left the lower courts alone, but
appointed its own Supreme Court.1
6
When the transition occurred in 1983, the Supreme Court Jus-
tices appointed by the dictatorship tendered their resignations, as
indeed was customary in Argentina in such circumstances.
2 7 I
would argue, however, that even if they had not been so accommo-
dating, President Alfonsin could have demanded their resignations
and tried to remove them through the impeachment process. As a
practical matter, he may not have had the political power to do so,
but for our purposes what is important is that he had the moral
authority to do so; the norm of independence did not constrain
him. Alfonsin should not have been required to respect the inde-
pendence of the Justices appointed by the previous regime, not
merely because the previous regime was nondemocratic, but more
fundamentally and more simply because it was another regime. In-
dependence does not require one regime to accept the judges em-
powered by another.
Of course, if we had a situation where a democratic regime
were overthrown by a dictatorship, and the transition thus worked
in another direction, we may well want the dictators to leave in
office the justices appointed by the previous, democratic govern-
ment. These Justices could act as a countervailing force. But it
seems to me that the desire to leave them in office derives not from
the ideal of judicial independence, but rather from a number of
other factors-our commitment to the democratic nature of the old
government, the view that the claim to power of the incumbent
justices is more legitimate than the usurper's, or simply from the
hope that the incumbent justices will use their power to check the
power of the dictator. These factors are considerable and may well
supply the basis for an asymmetrical rule-one that would force
dictators to respect democracy's judges, but allow democrats to
free themselves of the dictator's judges-but it is hard to see how
such a rule might be properly grounded on the claim for indepen-
dence that stems from the very nature of the judicial function. Im-
agine for a moment that one dictatorship overthrew another, and
26. Alejandro M. Garro, The Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Govern-
mental Action Under a State of Siege, 4 HuM. RTS. L.J. 311, 314-15 (1983).
27. Argentina: Controversy Surrounding the Judiciary, supra note 24, at 2. But see
Rosenn, supra note 22, at 27 (describing court changes prior to 1976 as dismissals); Garro,
supra note 26, at 314 (describing these changes as purges).
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thus none of the factors relating to the democratic character of the
prior regime were present. Would we insist that the new dictator
has an obligation to respect the judges of the previous regime? I
doubt it.
Obviously, the qualification I am proposing to the ideal of in-
dependence makes crucial the scope one assigns to the notion of a
regime-shift-a subject that requires further investigation and
elaboration. At this juncture, however, it should be emphasized
that more than an ordinary change of administrations is required;
there has to be a decisive break with the past, almost a constitu-
tional change. The shift from Alfonsin to Menem in 1989 was sim-
ply a change in administration; the transfer of power from the
junta to Alfonsin in 1983 was a regime shift. Admittedly, in other
cases-for example, Chile in 1989-it will be much harder to ascer-
tain whether or not there has been a regime shift. Yet even there,
the framework I am proposing, which conceives independence as a
regime relative virtue, may be helpful in understanding the strate-
gies properly available to a new government.
In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet seized power from the gov-
ernment of Salvador Allende. 2a From that time until 1980, Pi-
nochet claimed that he ruled according to the Chilean Constitution
of 1925, but that claim was a farce. He assumed the presidency
through force, Congress was dissolved, generals were placed in con-
trol of civilian agencies, and though the courts continued to func-
tion, the writ of habeas corpus was effectively suspended.2 9 In
1980, Pinochet proposed a new Constitution, which was then
adopted by a plebiscite conducted without free and open debate.
The new Constitution radically revised and supplemented the 1925
Constitution, introducing a number of authoritarian elements.
The 1980 Constitution retained the presidential system, but
restructured Congress and put off congressional elections until
1989. It further provided that Pinochet would retain the presi-
dency until March 1989.30 A plebiscite would be held prior to that
28. For a review of Chile's recent past, see SIGLER ET AL., supra note 22, at 15-36.
29. Historical legal constraints were avoided by military trials which often involved
summary proceedings and the violation of due process. Hugo Fruhling, Repressive Policies
and Legal Dissent in Authoritarian Regimes: Chile 1973-81, 12 INT'L J. Soc. L. 351, 354
(1984). The Supreme Court of Chile rejected writs of habeas corpus on the grounds that the
Code of Military Justice did not allow the courts to intervene in martial law cases. Id. at
363-64, 370.




date to determine whether the General would remain in office for
another eight years. If he lost, elections would promptly be held to
determine who would replace him as President. (Regardless of the
outcome, Pinochet would remain Commander-in-Chief of the
Army until 1997.) Beginning in 1983, the reign of terror lessened,
and the political climate in Chile improved, but it was still some-
thing of a miracle when the opposition defeated Pinochet in the
October 1988 plebiscite, and again when Patricio Aylwin defeated
Pinochet's candidate in the presidential election of December
1989.31 Aylwin is a Christian Democrat, but he was supported in
that election by a coalition of some seventeen parties.
President Aylwin took office in March 1990, and served a four-
year term prescribed by the Constitution. The overriding purpose
of his administration was to effectuate a smooth and durable tran-
sition to democracy. He governed with a broad political base, but
always within the terms of the 1980 Constitution-even though
that document was adopted during a reign of terror which of
course cast a cloud over its validity. In July 1989, the newly elected
Congress amended the Constitution to remove some of its more
draconian provisions, 2 but the amendment process was extremely
cumbersome, and no further amendments were adopted. Crucial
provisions can only be amended by a three-fifths vote of both
houses,33 and nine of the forty-seven Senators are appointed rather
than elected. As the 1980 Constitution provided, two of the nine
were directly appointed by Pinochet (acting as President), and the
remaining seven were appointed by institutions controlled by Pi-
nochet-the National Security Council (which appointed four) and
the Supreme Court (which appointed three).34
It should also be emphasized that throughout the Aylwin years
Pinochet had control of the army and presumably was prepared to
use that power to protect his Constitution. Indeed, in May 1993
Pinochet staged an electrifying display of military force in down-
town Santiago. His purpose was to demonstrate his displeasure
with how the President was handling certain matters that affected
the army, including the investigation of the military for human
31. See MARK FALCOFF, MODERN CHILE 1970-1989: A CRITICAL HISTORY 311-12 (1989).
32. For an analysis of one such provision, the notorious Article 8, see Pablo Ruiz-Tagle,
Debate Publico Restringido en Chile (1980-1988), 16 REVISTA CHILENA DE DERECHO 111
(1989).
33. CHILE CONST. art. 63, translated in SIGLER ET. AL., supra note 22, at 55.
34. CHILE CONST. art. 45 (as amended), translated in SIGLER ET. AL., supra note 22, at
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rights abuses during the dictatorship.
Not only was Aylwin encumbered by the 1980 Constitution
and the military might lying behind it, but he inherited a Supreme
Court that was largely molded by Pinochet. When the General
seized power in 1973, he dissolved Congress, but left the Supreme
Court-no friend of Allende-in power.3 5 The President of the
Court, Enrique Urratia Manzano, placed the "presidential band"
on the General and proudly declared, "I put the judiciary in your
hands." Unlike the Argentine junta, Pinochet did not replace the
individual justices when he came to power-there was no need
to-and for the most part, the rulings of the Supreme Court sup-
ported or strengthened Pinochet's reign. The 1980 Constitution
left the personnel and structure of the Supreme Court unchanged,
with only one exception. While retirement at seventy-five became a
constitutional requirement (previously it was an administrative
regulation, but was breached during the Pinochet years), an excep-
tion was made for the incumbent justices.3 6 They could serve for
life.
In 1973, the Supreme Court consisted of twelve justices.
Under Pinochet, the Court was expanded so that by 1988 it had
seventeen members. Between 1973 and 1988, five of the twelve
original seats on the Court became vacant and were filled by Pi-
nochet, which meant that at the time of the October 1988 plebi-
scite, ten of the seventeen justices were Pinochet appointees.
Moreover, immediately after the plebiscite but before the Decem-
ber 1989 election, two pre-Pinochet justices left the Court (one
died and one retired), and Pinochet offered the aging justices who
remained generous pensions, so-called "golden parachutes.""7 Six
accepted this offer-two of whom were appointed before
1973-and Pinochet filled these vacancies too. By the time Aylwin
took office in March 1990, he confronted a Supreme Court consist-
ing of a total of fourteen Pinochet appointees, some newly ap-
pointed. The other three were not appointed by Pinochet-one
was appointed by Allende in 1971, and the two others were ap-
pointed in the mid-1960s by Eduardo Frei, a Christian Demo-
35. One of the primary justifications for the military takeover was the restoration of
constitutional order. Rosenn, supra note 22, at 30-31. The Allende government had refused
to enforce Supreme Court decisions ordering the return of illegally occupied land and ille-
gally seized factories. Eugenio Velasco, The Allende Regime in Chile: An Historical and
Legal Analysis (Part II), 9 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 711, 725-27 (1976).
36. CHILE CONST. transitory provision 8.
37. Letter from Rodrigo P. Correa to Owen M. Fiss (Oct. 19, 1992) (on file with author).
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crat-but all served during the dictatorship. The new President
therefore had to face the question-only hypothetical in the case
of Alfonsin in Argentina-whether he had to respect the indepen-
dence of those justices who were either appointed by the dictator
or who had served him during his regime.3 8 What could Aylwin
have done legitimately to control the Court?
In addressing this question, it is important to acknowledge the
special and complex situation that Aylwin faced. On the one hand,
he derived his power from the 1980 Constitution and thus was not
altogether free from the constraints it lays down. On the other
hand, given the non-democratic elements of the 1980 Constitution,
the circumstances surrounding its adoption, and Aylwin's repudia-
tion of Pinochet's dictatorial policies, Aylwin's administration
could well be understood as a partial break with the predecessor
regime-a relation one might call a "partial regime-shift." Aylwin's
Chile, in this regard, fell somewhere between Alfonsin's Argentina
and the Argentina of Menem-between a sharp regime shift and a
simple change of administrations. In such an in-between situation,
in-between remedies may be appropriate.
One such remedy might be court-packing-increasing the size
of the Supreme Court so as to enable the President to make new
appointments. This idea was discussed in the early days of the
Aylwin administration, and though the need for such a remedy be-
came less urgent over time, as vacancies were created by retire-
ments and even a death of a justice, 9 in 1993 a proposal to add
38. The sensitivity of the Supreme Court to the limits of its power was revealed in its
handling of a controversy involving Carlos Cerda, a court of appeals judge greatly admired
by human rights groups in Chile. The controversy began in the mid-1980s, before President
Aylwin came to power, when Cerda undertook an investigation of the disappearance in 1976
of thirteen members of the Communist Party. The persons accused of this crime claimed
that the investigation was barred by the 1978 amnesty law, and the Supreme Court agreed
and ordered Cerda to desist from his investigation. When he refused, the Supreme Court
suspended him for two months. That occurred in 1986. In 1990, after the plebiscite ousting
Pinochet and after the election of Aylwin, Cerda resumed the investigation and the Su-
preme Court then responded by reaffirming its previous order requiring him to desist. Cerda
stopped the proceedings but refused to dismiss the case altogether, and then the Supreme
Court entered an order in effect requiring the President to removed Cerda from office.
There was an immediate and enormous public uproar over this order, and following a formal
request for reconsideration by Cerda, the Supreme Court backed down. Nevertheless, Cerda
did ultimately close the case in August 1990. Despite his compliance with the Supreme
Court's order, the Supreme Court disciplined Cerda in January 1991 by suspending him for
two months on half salary. For Cerda's distinctive conception of judicial independence, what
I have called "individual autonomy," see Pablo Ruiz-Tagle, Analisis Comparado de la Fun-
ci6n Judicial, 39 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS PUBLICO 131, 154-58 (1990).
39. One vacancy arose from the death of a justice appointed by Pinochet shortly before
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four new justices to the Supreme Court was put before Congress.
Such a proposal is obviously two sided: It accepts the authority of
the justices in office, but seeks to dilute their power by adding new
ones. It weakens the stranglehold of the past, but does not break
from it altogether. Even nominal adherence to the norm of politi-
cal insularity could be achieved if the increase in the size of the
Court could be justified in terms of increased caseloads or new
needs for expertise. Not surprisingly, Aylwin's proposal to increase
the size of the Supreme Court was joined with a number of other
reform measures, including one that would add new specialized
panels (or "salas") to the Court.
In the hands of President Roosevelt, court-packing was justly
regarded as an improper assault on an independent judiciary, and
ever since, a strong tradition has existed against it in the United
States. But this tradition actually depends on certain background
assumptions about the terms and conditions under which the
power of the administration has been acquired. The United States
stance on court-packing has been forged in the context of a contin-
uous democracy-two hundred years of a shifting, but generally
stable government-and has only limited applicability to a transi-
tional democracy. True, the 1930s in the United States was a tur-
bulent period in constitutional history, but no one would claim
that there had been a transformation in governmental structure
that could be characterized as a regime shift, partial or otherwise.40
The same is true of the Menem administration in Argentina
and thus it should have respected the same norm against court-
packing. Menem acquired power through the constitutionally pre-
scribed mechanisms, and though he instituted a new economic pol-
icy and abandoned, or perhaps even reversed, Alfonsin's human
rights policy, these changes were within the framework of normal
politics. Menem's Argentina was not a transitional democracy.
Aylwin's Chile was different. Aylwin obtained power through the
constitutionally prescribed process, but nonetheless sufficiently
broke with the past so as to permit him to pursue alternatives that
otherwise seemed forbidden in a continuous democracy.
the election, and four other vacancies arose from retirements. Some retirements were facili-
tated by the enactment in July 1992 of a law that, in effect, continued in force the generous
retirement program Pinochet had established in 1989. It applied to those justices over sev-
enty and who held office at the time the law was passed.
40. Bruce Ackerman does not regard the New Deal as a regime shift, but describes it as
a decisive moment in American history "at which deep changes in popular opinion gained
authoritative constitutional recognition." ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 41, 47-50.
[Vol. 25:1
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Although Aylwin's effort to increase the size of the Supreme
Court came to naught, oddly enough, a more troublesome rem-
edy-impeachment-proved more viable. In January 1993, the
Chamber of Deputies impeached three justices of the Supreme
Court, and ten days later the Senate voted to remove one of them,
Hernan Cerceda Bravo, from office. All three justices were mem-
bers of a single panel of the Supreme Court that had decided a few
months before to transfer jurisdiction of a human rights case from
a civilian to a military tribunal-a decision which, in effect,
brought the prosecution to an end. The first, and by all accounts,
principal count of the impeachment focused on the merits of this
particular decision. It was claimed that the decision to transfer the
jurisdiction to the military court was arbitrary and contrary to
Chile's obligations under international agreements.
The other two counts of the impeachment involved prosecu-
tions that had been brought against opponents of the Pinochet re-
gime charged with attempting to assassinate the General and with
murdering and kidnapping military personnel. One of those counts
charged the justices of improperly collaborating with the auditor
general of the army, who was acting as a prosecutor in the criminal
proceedings arising from attacks on the military. Another focused
on the delay of the Supreme Court in rendering a decision in an
appeal filed by two persons charged with kidnapping military per-
sonnel. Chilean law and the Court's own rules require that such
appeals be decided within 15 days, yet the panel took over five
months to render its decision. During all this time, two persons
accused of the kidnapping remained in jail.
The Chamber of Deputies voted 66 to 39 (with one abstention)
to impeach all three justices on all three counts. "1 However, the
Senate voted, 25 to 20, only to convict and remove Cereceda from
office, and based its decision solely on the third count: the one
charging the justices with improper delay in rendering their deci-
sion. The decision to remove Cerceda critically depended on the
support of three senators from a conservative faction and obviously
rested on the narrowest and most technical of all the charges. Note
should be taken of the fact that Cereceda was widely disliked and
that he had tried to cover up the delay in the decision by altering
dates on court documents. But the wider implication of the entire
impeachment proceeding was not lost on the public nor on the
41. The Chamber of Deputies also impeached the auditor general of the army on all
three counts, but he was not removed by the Senate.
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Court. In essence, Congress was expressing its strong disapproval
of a Supreme Court decision, and due to the exigencies of politics
or the simple fact that Cerceda was the senior justice on the panel,
Congress took out its wrath on him. No one can prove with abso-
lute certainty that this was the basis of Congress's decision-proof
of that character is never available in impeachment proceed-
ings-but it is a likely scenario, and that fact alone is reason for
concern on the part of those committed to the independence of the
judiciary and the view that it be insulated from politics.
In considering the possibility of court-packing, I argued
against the automatic transfer to a transitional democracy of the
rules and norms established in a continuous democracy such as the
United States. This same perspective should govern any evaluation
of the use of the impeachment power; as I argued in the case of
Alfonsin's Argentina, the impeachment power should be able to ac-
commodate regime shifts and allow a new regime to remove from
office those judges who were placed in office by the previous regime
or who willingly served that regime. The situation in Aylwin's
Chile was somewhat more complex, however, because, as I argued,
that was not a complete but a partial regime shift, calling for inter-
mediate remedies. While court-packing seems such a remedy, I
have doubts about the use of the impeachment power during the
Aylwin years.
It is true that the impeachment power was used on an individ-
ualized basis. There was no effort to impeach or remove all the
justices who served under the Pinochet regime. Charges were
brought against only three, and only one was removed. It is also
true that, as in the case of court-packing, the President was not
entirely free to fill the new vacancy with someone entirely of his
own choosing; he had to choose from the short list submitted by
the Supreme Court. Yet impeachment from office, unlike court-
packing, put the political branches of government into the business
of second-guessing the Court on the merits of its decisions. It thus
struck at the heart of the values that the norm of political insular-
ity seeks to further: a commitment to justice, not politics. Of
course, efforts will be made to limit this use of the impeachment
power to especially egregious errors of the judiciary, but everyone
knows how easily those labels are manipulated. Once unleashed,
this use of the impeachment power is likely to make the judiciary
more responsive to political forces and thus less able to claim the
full measure of its authority.
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